Message transmission in vehicular networks is increasing in popularity which exploits the network nodes to transmit messages using cooperative communication in a multi-hop fashion. But the increasing number of malicious nodes in the high-speed Internet of Vehicles demands additional methodologies to quickly detect the presence of such nodes to avoid serious security consequences. Early detection of malicious nodes, and accurate assessment of complex data to assess the node reliability are of absolute importance in vehicular networks. To this end, this paper proposes a security scheme that uses evidence combination method to combine local data with external evidence to evaluate the reliability of multi-dimensional data received from other peer nodes. In addition, this paper uses European Telecommunications Standards Institute standard and Decentralized Environmental Notification Message, and proposes a trust calculation method based on collaborative filtering by introducing a small-time interval to detect the changes in the node behaviors. While the former solution helps more accurate computation of the direct trust value, the latter scheme can calculate the indirect trust based on recommendations received from neighbors, ultimately to obtain the global trust value. Finally, more effective traffic data can be obtained to help traffic prediction. Experiments conducted under various network scenarios demonstrate that our proposed scheme outperforms the existing trust models, such as precision or recall and can resist bad-mouth attacks, selective-misbehavior attacks, and time-dependent attacks, especially under larger proportions of malicious nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of Internet of Vehicles, as an integration of Internet of Things (IoT) and wireless vehicular communication networks, provides more effective value-added services for vehicular users [1] , [2] , as is shown in Fig.1 . Enhanced safety and intelligent traffic system is always a growing need for any road transportation system. IoV can potentially facilitate a safety-aware evaluation of road traffic conditions and with the aid of other modern information technology, accurate evaluation and prediction of traffic conditions are also possible. For example Decentralized Environmental Notification Message (DENM), as proposed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), periodically broadcasts The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yulei Wu. messages to vehicles for providing traffic-related status information and event-related asynchronous warning notifications and danger alerts. Such process usually involves message transmission targeted at multiple people or cars, using high-speed wireless networks. In this context, IoV exhibits excellent potential for developing effective and reasonable routes and behavior plans for individuals involved in transportation. However, in a realistic scenario, any two vehicle nodes may not communicate directly during most of the instances. Often, vehicles need to cooperate with other peer nodes for relaying information through a multi-hop broadcast vehicles-to-vehicles communication. Thus, the reliability of the relay nodes has an important role to play in such a transmission. IoV, due to its open wireless channel characteristics and increasing reliance on communication technology, is also more vulnerable to malicious attacks such as VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ bad-mouth attacks, selective-misbehavior attacks and timedependent attacks etc. It is common for vehicle nodes to reject the relay request from other peer vehicles in order to save their own resources from being compromised by adversaries. So it is important to evaluate not only the trustworthiness of the interacting nodes, but also the legality of the received messages. Existing trust models mainly interrogate the user's information which helps decision-making during the trust evaluation process. Trust value calculation in existing models usually depends on the integration of multiple types of data, but this may not hold well due to the complex relationship among the data [3] . Nodes sometimes may encounter conflicting traffic information reported by multiple sources. Thus trust evaluation models should necessarily include data integration, and accurate calculation of the trust value. A good range of works have been previously proposed for the trust models. The work presented in [4] evaluated the node trustworthiness by referring to the trust value of nodes, believing that nodes with highly recommended trust value is trustworthy. However, it is possible that nodes performing well during data forwarding (data is correctly forwarded), may behave maliciously later during recommendation (provides incorrect recommendation information). Therefore, filtering out the dishonest nodes becomes a serious challenge. The paper [5] proposed to use data fusion technology to merge multiple data reported by different nodes so as to extract more effective messages. Collaborative cooperation usually plays a significant role in IoV, since the data contributed by a single user is often incomplete and sparse. Furthermore, the network often includes dishonest nodes, which restrains two vehicles being connected. This paper is aimed at overcoming the drawbacks of traditional trust models by resolving the aforementioned problems, based on the D-S theory. This is achieved by analyzing the local data along with the received traffic data and by using the evidence combination method to help traffic prediction and management. According to the ETSI standard and DENM, vehicles calculate direct trust based on direct interactions. In order to reduce the impacts of collusion (that is, users only submit positive feedback to their friends in order to enhance their respective credit ratings and submit negative feedback to others), this paper uses the trust recommendation of collaborative filtering, and uses the Resnick standard prediction formula [6] to calculate the recommended trust of the neighbor nodes, finally obtains the global trust. To evaluate the performance of proposed scheme, large-scale experiments have been conducted. Experiment results show that the proposed scheme can accurately evaluate node trust and data trust, can detect malicious behavior effectively, and can resist attacks such as bad-mouth attacks, selectivemisbehavior attacks and time-dependent attacks. Even in the situation where the proportion of malicious nodes is relatively large, the proposed scheme outperforms the existing techniques. More specifically, this paper presents a trust management based on evidence combination called TMEC to cope with malicious attacks, and evaluates the global node trust and data trust. The major contributions of this work are listed as follows.
• Firstly, the evidence combination method is used to evaluate multi-dimensional data trust based on D-S theory in order to obtain more effective traffic data.
• Secondly, we use the ETSI standard and DENM to perceive the interactions between vehicles and to evaluate the direct trust in each time period, which is beneficial to quickly detect the change of behavior patterns.
• Thirdly, in order to avoid collusion attacks, the proposed TMEC scheme adopts the trust recommendation of collaborative filtering and selects the trustworthy neighbors by using Cosine-based similarity, ultimately to get a more accurate global trust value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze the current situation of existing trust management and the detection of dishonest behaviors, and point out their advantages and disadvantages. Section 3 introduces the model definition of the TMEC scheme. The proposed scheme is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the experimental study has been conducted. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORKS
Recently, the existence of selfishness and malicious behaviors has extremely motivated the research in the area of trust management. Trust management bypasses traditional cryptography-based security mechanisms to handle internal attackers who own certificates, which is widely used for secure communications over vehicular networks [7] . Moreover, trust model can potentially overcome the security drawbacks found in existing cryptography-based solutions. Trust models are used to protect privacy and to ensure secure and reliable data dissemination in IoV. Trust management is divided into three categories such as Entity-oriented Trust Models (ETM), Data-oriented Trust Models (DTM) and Hybrid-oriented Trust Models (HTM).
A. ETM
In order to ensure secure communication and to prevent malicious nodes from sending fake messages or from forwarding any messages, ETM evaluates the reputation of the nodes in a distributed mode without the need for processing the exchanged data. Buchegger et al. [8] presented the CONFIDANT protocol, which encourages nodes collaboration to penalize misbehaving nodes. CONFIDANT sets up four components in each node: a Monitor, a Reputation System, a Trust Manager and a Path Manager. The Monitor is used to observe and identify abnormal routing behaviors. The Reputation System calculates the reputation of each node based on the observed behaviors. The Trust Manager exchanges alerts with other trust managers about node misbehaviors. The Path Manager maintains path rankings and responds to various routing messages. The possible downside of CONFIDANT is that an attacker could deliberately propagate a false alarm to other nodes, whereby altering a good node as malicious. In order to detect and eliminate malicious nodes, Haddadou et al. [9] used the trust value based on the node's behaviors to estimate its sending cost. Malicious nodes usually characterize a higher sending cost, which limits the activities of malicious nodes in the network. Unfortunately, communication overheads increase with a decrease in the network cooperation ability. Choosing the initial cost and distinguishing the selfish behaviors and resolving the packet loss issues during transmission are quite challenging in this scheme.
B. DTM
In order to avoid the removal of malicious nodes leading to connection interruption between nodes, we only consider filtering malicious data without revocation of malicious nodes in DTM. Zhang et al. [10] proposed a semi-distributed trust management for message dissemination and evaluation. The cluster head is responsible for broadcasting and collecting the broadcast opinions, and for discarding the untrustworthy messages and/or relays those are not legitimate. But the main problem of this scheme lies in the choice of cluster heads, particularly when malicious nodes become the cluster heads. Gurung et al. [11] used three key metrics such as content similarity, content conflicts, and routing path similarity to determine whether the received message is legal or not.
However, this scheme have not considered the high time complexity, high mobility and the case of node sparsity into account. A data-based trust model has been proposed in [12] , in which the trust of any entity depends on its role (e.g. the trust value T [police vehicle = 1; common vehicle = 0.5]). This model used different trust metrics to determine whether the reported events are real. Finally, Dempster-Shafer theory and Bayesian inference have been used to assess the evidence associated with the events. However, this method exhibits good performance only for the cases of non-redundant and sufficient data but does not have obvious advantages when vehicles is sparse in the network.
C. HTM
HTM is designed to ensure reliable communication between nodes, and to recuperate malicious nodes and messages that could potentially cause an interruption, mainly based on node reputation ratings, which is similar to ETM. Marmol et al. [13] proposed a scheme to support VANETs trust and reputation management, where the nodes have been divided into three different trust levels and the protocol has been associated with the confidence of each messages. Comparisons have been made with the three fuzzy sets (untrusted, +/− trust, trust) by combining the node category, the message confidence level and the recommended messages from RSUs and other nodes. Then decisions have been made upon whether the received messages can be forwarded or not. A given message will be dropped if it belongs to the first set, accepted but not forwarded if it belongs to the second set, and both accepted and forwarded for the trusted ones. However, this scheme has pitfalls in the number of recommendations and the trust value of the recommended nodes. Li et al. [14] proposed a trust management scheme based on the reputation, which evaluated the credibility of the senders and the messages sent by senders under three dimensions: direct trust, indirect trust and node reputation. However, using an additional infrastructure, called the reputation management center to achieve the centralized trust computation increases the communication overhead.
Under the assumption that all application messages are encrypted, Chen et al. [15] proposed a beacon-based trust model to enhance the user's location privacy protection. The proposed scheme used beacons and event-based messages to protect the privacy of VANETs. The main idea is to cross-check the feasibility of these two types of messages to determine whether other messages are trusted or not. Although this solution can achieve privacy protection of multi-hop vehicles (more than one hop), it cannot effectively evaluate various kinds of information and cannot detect attacks that take place on the upper layer (application, routing and etc.). T-CLAIDS [16] proposed a trust-aware intrusion detection solution, where the node density, mobility and the vehicle movement direction have been taken into account. This solution maintains probability matrices of all actions, which is updated in the iteration until a convergence value is achieved, in order to provide an approximate representation of the global trust. This scheme performs well when the malicious behaviors are stable throughout a given time, but not very efficient in the case of unpredictable events. Furthermore, the convergence time of the vector becomes very long when the nodes are sparse. Using standardized message services of ETSI-ITS [17] , [18] , T-VNets [19] can predict traffic and assess the distribution of attackers within the network. The T-VNets protocol achieves high detection rates and low overhead, which now is the only Standardized Trust Architecture. Table 1 illustrates the performance comparison of a few typical schemes of different requirements, where '' √ '' shows that the scheme satisfies the requirements. ''×'' represents the scheme do not satisfy the requirements and ''−'' represents that the paper did not consider this requirement. As shown in Table 1 , existing works still characterize several deficiencies, such as data trust and the characteristic of Attack-Resistant. But the TMEC scheme can fully meet the requirements of anti-attack in IoV.
III. DEFINITION
This section discusses the recent research problem, and introduces the network model and the attack model.
A. NETWORK MODEL
IoV refers to a mobile communication network which combines wireless communication technology with IoV, and provides value-added services for vehicular users based on the social relationship between vehicles communicating with each other through collaboration. IoV can continuously monitor and share road and traffic conditions. The upper IoV server is usually a set of powerful server clusters, whose powerful computing and storage capabilities provide roadside communication services and store information such as vehicle identity and historical interactions, which is equivalent to car cloud. The middle layer is designed to create a virtual environment for vehicles' trust assessment and to undertake communication with neighboring roadside units in a light-weight environment. The lower layer is aimed to solve the vehicle cooperation. The vehicle accesses a local network and transmits data through multi-hop cooperative communication. All the vehicles share the resources reserved in the middle layer to support the completion of trust assessment among vehicles, which improves the resource utilization rate and service quality of the vehicles, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Recently, IEEE802.11p has been widely used for data transmission between vehicles to vehicles (V2V) and vehicles to roadside units (V2R). In the future, 5G will bring a new communication area with faster data transmission, lower delay and higher reliability [20] .
B. TRUST MODEL
Trust is a subjective behavior expectation to choose which nodes to cooperate with, even take action to punish the malicious nodes if necessary [21] . Each user can only derive the trust value of a given part of the nodes, and the trusted nodes will also trust another part of the nodes. As this phenomenon is propagated, starting from any node, this trust relationship will continue to spread along the network. So, vehicles never directly interacted before in IoV can also agree with a basic understanding and establish an appropriate trust relationship. In IoV, message filtering is implemented through the mutual trust evaluation between vehicles, as shown in Fig. 2 . The TMEC can be divided into different modules responsible for (1) Computing data trust; (2) Estimating the global trust; (3) Detecting the malicious attacks. The vehicle entity combines the collected traffic evidence to calculate the data trust to assess the data reliability. Then the global trust value is obtained by direct trust and indirect trust, which is used to assess the behavior of the target node. Then the calculated trust value is updated into its own trust list.
C. ATTACK MODEL
The entities involved in transportation are more susceptible to various attacks, such that nodes and messages can be compromised at any time. An adversary can eavesdrop, block, modify, forge or discard information within the wireless communication range between any devices. Its main objectives include interception of normal data transmission, forging or modification of data, submission of false advice to build benign nodes etc. [22] , [23] . Specifically, this paper takes the following malicious attacks into account.
Bad-Mouth Attacks: Malicious nodes spread negative comments about a benign node to compromise its reputation in the network. This collusion may lead to blocking effective paths in the network by confusing the trust and reputation management mechanisms.
Selective Misbehavior Attacks: This attack means that the malicious node provides some nodes with false messages, works properly for other nodes in the network. The behavior modes of attackers are inconsistent with different people, which leads to inconsistent trust between different nodes and such nodes are difficult to be detected by the trust management schemes.
Time-dependent Attacks: The nodes change their behavior based on time in this attack. Nodes work normally for some time, but provide unfair ratings at other times.
IV. SCHEME DESIGN
This section details the proposed TMEC scheme. Direct trust and recommended trust have been considered in our approach in order to aid vehicles whilst evaluating the trust value with better accuracy. The TMEC scheme is based on the DENM of ETSI standard. Assuming that node j is a direct neighbor of node i, then node i can verify whether the event j broadcasts is true or false. In this scenario, the vehicle first perceives the traffic data, uses the evidence combination method to analyze the large amount of collected data, and extracts useful information, sums up the evidence of data analysis for trust management, and assesses the data trust. This process calculates the global trust value, as shown in Fig. 3 . The system parameter definition is given in Table 2 .
A. DATA TRUST
Dempster-Shafer theory (D-S) [24] , [25] is used to combine multiple pieces of evidence together even though some of the traffic data may not be accurate. In DST, the probability is replaced by the uncertainty interval of the belief function (bel) and the plausibility function (pl), that is, (bel, pl), which denotes the uncertain interval in the suspicious behaviors of the nodes. Bel is the lower bound of this interval and represents the supporting evidence. In other words, (0, bel) indicates a preference for support and so the node is trusted. Pl is the upper bound of this interval and represents nondenied evidence. Therefore, (pl, 1) indicates a preference to reject, since it regards the corresponding node as malicious. The bel with regards to event e i observed by node N i is calculated as follows.
e b represents all the basic events that make up event e i . m N i (e b ) represents the view of node N i to event e b . Particularly, if node N i only has a single report of the node N k , that is e i ⊂ e i .
From the D-S theory, it can be understood that there is a certain relationship between pl and bel, that is
Among them, e i is the event that does not appear in e i . So,
Given that trust represents the lower bound of the uncertainty interval and indicates supportive evidence, the node trust value can be defined as follows.
donates the view of node N k on another node N i . Reports from different nodes can be combined using the D-S theory. Specifically, the D-S theory is used to combine the local evidence collected by the nodes themselves and the external evidence shared by other nodes, as shown below.
r:e q ∩e r =N i m 1 (e q )m 2 (e r ) 1 − q,r:e q ∩e r =φ m 1 (e q )m 2 (e r ) (7) B. RECOMMENDATION TRUST Nodes with similar characteristics may also exhibit similar preferences on other nodes. Therefore, based on the collaborative filtering, this paper uses the Cosine-based similarity metric to measure the similarity between two vectors [26] . Then, the similarity cos(j,k) between two nodes is measured by computing the cosine angle between the two vectors, as shown in Equation 8, where ''•'' represents the dot product of two vectors. r r cos(j, k)
Smaller value of cos (j, k) represents a greater conflict degree between two given nodes, with a lower similarity. In particular, the recommended trust value is computed using the following steps.
(1) Form Trust Matrix: Each node forms a trust rating on other nodes, which is defined as a matrix R.
(2) Choose Trusted Neighbors: Calculate the similarity of all the nodes in the model, and then select top i most similar nodes.
(3) Calculate Neighbors Recommendation Trust: Calculate the recommended trust value IT (j, k) of node j on node k. S i is the set of most similar nodes to node j. R j = i R j,i and R k = i R k,i represent the overall trust ratings to other nodes of node j and node k, respectively. Based on Resnick's standard prediction formula, IT (j, k) is calculated as follows.
In order to quickly detect the changes in the node behavior patterns, the TMEC scheme introduces a small time interval to assess the direct trust value of each time period [27] . Before calculating the direct trust, let H t x (j,k) represents the reports of node j to the legal behavior of node k over a certain period of time t x . Then H t x (j,k) is calculated as follows. where, x ≥ 1, L t x (j,k) and M t x (j,k) stand for the number of legal and malicious interactions, respectively.
represents the proportion that legal interactions account for, and 1 − 1
is a variable parameter. When the legal interaction of vehicles increases (their value of H t x (j,k) will approach closer to 1), their honesty index will also increase. The noted range of honesty values of the nodes under different time periods are used to calculate the direct trust, where the recent time period enjoys better weightage. Specifically, the direct trust is calculated as follows.
where, α is a factor between 0 and 1 which denotes the weight given to the involved time periods. The precondition before computing the direct trust is that the node j and node k must have interacted at least once, otherwise, DT (j, k) is still unchanged from its current value.
D. GLOBAL TRUST
In IoV, the global trust usually relies on two types of trust to evaluate the node behaviors, that is, the direct trust and the recommended trust. The recommended trust is given in Section 4.2, and the direct trust is given in Section 4.3. Direct trust is defined as the direct interaction between vehicles based on local evidence. Indirect trust, on the other hand, is the interaction between vehicles based on the views of others, so direct trust is more important than indirect trust. Suppose that the vehicle interaction frequency is n. As the number of vehicle interactions increases, we use 1/(n + 1) as an adjustment factor so that direct trust can be assigned with more weight. Then, the global trust is calculated as follows.
V. SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE
This paper uses NS2 as simulation platform. To evaluate the proposed TMEC Scheme, we rely on the IEEE 802.11p standard to compare the performance of the baseline method [28] . The generated vehicular traffic is based on Citymob mobility model [29] , which uses SUMO [30] to create mobility traces. Table 3 lists the parameters used in the simulation scenario.
Here, we use Precision (P) and Recall (R) as evaluation parameters, which are widely used in Machine Learning and Information Retrieval for accuracy assessment. In this paper, P and R are defined as follows [31] .
P = real malicious nodes detected untrusted nodes detected

R = malicious nodes detected real malicious nodes (14)
A. PRECISION AND RECALL Fig. 4 shows the precision and recall value with respect to the node density. Fig. 4(a) compares the precision of the TMEC method with the baseline method when the node density varies. Experiments show that when the node density is high, the precision of both the two methods is higher than 90%, but the precision of the proposed scheme is always higher than the baseline method. This is due to the fact that with more number of nodes, the probability of receiving real data from other vehicles is higher, which makes it easier to detect dishonest behaviors. The TMEC uses D-S theory, to fuse different evidence, in order to get new evidence, where (bel, 1) donates untrusted range and (pl, 1) donates absolutely malicious nodes. Similarly, Fig. 4(b) shows the comparison of recall between the TMEC and the baseline method. It can be observed that the recall of the proposed TMEC method is also better than the baseline method. Assuming that the value of R is x/y, if the number of real malicious nodes is increases to y + a, then the maximum value of R could be (x + a)/(y + a). In addition, (x + a)/(y + a) is more than x/y.
In other words, as the number of nodes increases, the recall rate becomes higher. Fig. 5 (a) and Fig. 5(b) presents the comparison between TMEC and other schemes based on precision and recall at different percentages of malicious nodes in the network. When the proportion of malicious nodes is higher, corresponding decrease in both precision and recall is noted. However, recall and precision of the TMEC scheme are still higher than those of the other three methods. Further an increase in recall and precision of TMEC is not obvious when the percentage of malicious nodes increases. This is true because collaborative filtering provides advice or prediction to nodes, thus the quality of recommendations is greatly improved. In addition, D-S theory is used to combine multiple pieces of evidence together even though some of the traffic data may not be accurate. Fig. 6 shows the precision and recall in regards to the vehicle speed. It is evident that the TMEC scheme is superior to the baseline method. This is because that other schemes lack real-time online central management server, which makes them harder to realize vehicle information centralized transmission, storage and efficient evaluation, particularly when the speed of the vehicle increases. In addition, both the precision and recall decreases with an increase in the speed of the vehicle. This is due to the fact that along with an increase in the vehicle speed, the packet loss rate increases, which make it difficult for the nodes to spread information about untrusted vehicles. 
B. ANTI-ATTACK
In addition to the evaluation of the overall performance under different network parameters, this study also examines the feasibility of the proposed TMEC scheme under anti-attack. The attack model is presented in Section 2.3. Performance of the proposed TMEC scheme is evaluated against the baseline method under different types of malicious attacks. Let us assume that the misbehaving attack patterns of the nodes in the network characterize a probability of 0.5. In order to quickly detect the changes in the node behavior patterns, this paper introduces a small time interval, so as to comment on the trust of the nodes under each time period, which is effective against time-dependent attacks. Fig. 7 shows that the performance of precision and recall under bad-mouth attacks under increasing number of malicious nodes. It can be observed that even if 40% of the malicious nodes performs bad-mouth attacks, the precision and recall is still higher than 80%. But the baseline method is especially plagued by bad-mouth attacks. Note that bad-mouth attacks aim to intentionally share fake trust views so that the malicious nodes will be falsely accused of malicious behaviors. The use of collaborative filtering based on recommendation strategy and D-S theory makes the proposed scheme to be more resistant to attacks than the baseline method. Selective-misbehavior attacks show different attack patterns to different nodes, so it is difficult to identify attackers and malicious behaviors. Fig. 8 indicates that the TMEC scheme can still resist selective-misbehavior attacks and achieve high precision and recall. On the other hand, when the percentage of attackers increases, the precision and recall of the baseline method are significantly degraded.
C. DETECTION RATE
Using the global trust assessment, any vehicle j can evaluate its neighbor's trust value to assess the trustworthiness of neighbor vehicles k, in order to make decisions upon dropping untrustworthy messages or delaying legal messages for the purpose of continuing the dissemination process. The Trust Threshold varies in accordance with the security needs of the system. For example, the Trust Threshold may be higher for security-related events. Thus, whether the neighbor vehicle k is trusted or not is expressed as follows. Fig. 9 shows the comparison of the detection rate between the proposed TMEC scheme and a few baseline methods under the different Trust Threshold. It is clear that the detection rate of the proposed scheme is obviously better than other schemes. In addition, a higher Trust Threshold value corresponds to a lower detection rate. But the TMEC scheme always characterizes a higher detection rate than the other three schemes. Even when the Trust Threshold is high up to 0.9, the detection rate is still higher than 20%, but, the advantages of other methods are not obvious.
D. F-SCORE
Higher P value usually corresponds to a lower R value, and vice versa. In order to solve the problem of contradiction between P and R, we use F-Score (F) as an assessment metric to reflect the overall performance, which is defined as follows.
As evident from Fig. 10 , the value of F-Score decreases significantly as the Trust Threshold increases, especially when the Trust Threshold is more than 0.6, the F-Score value drops sharply. However, the value of F-Score of the proposed TMEC scheme is always better than the other three schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trust establishment over vehicular networks can enhance the security of vehicles against probable insider attackers. This paper presented an improved trust model to evaluate the user's trust value, analyze and detect malicious nodes, and further developed a trust management scheme based on evidence combination, called TMEC to resist attacks. When calculating the trust value, the proposed scheme introduced uncertainty to combine the information received from multiple sources. With the proposed scheme, dishonest behaviors of the nodes can be effectively detected under a small time interval. The simulation experiments also proved its validity of the proposed scheme under different experiment settings.
The key feature of IoV cooperative information exchange and its social application under different virtual communities [32] , which are changing the way of data exchange and communication. Different from the traditional mobile social networks [33] , according to the upper vehicle central cloud, IoV obtains the social relationships among the vehicular environments based on the analysis of their social networks, and provides a more personalized service based on the combination of their preferences and their geographical position. IoV facilitated novel strategies of securing message transmission with more ease and convenient. In the future, IoV can potentially combine individual isolated vehicles into a community through Internet of things. 
